摘要
信用分级机制是我国食品安全治理体系与治理能力现代化的又一关键举措。从政府与网络食品经营主体的角度,通过简单静态博弈发现网络食品合法经营良好局面更依赖于政府监管的刚性约束。出于对监管资源局限性的考虑,进一步构建信号博弈模型,设置一种由政府发起的优质商家申报信用分级机制,探讨政府对于商家违法投机行为的有效监督机制。研究表明:政府对于积极申报达标的商家给予一定奖励能够实现投机商家与合法商家的有效分离,减少商家投机行为。这一奖励与投机商家虚假申报达标的伪装成本、合法商家积极申报达标的成本以及投机商家开展投机经营活动所受到政府的处罚有关。
Credit grading mechanism is another key measure for the modernization of food safety management system and managerial abilities in China. From the perspective of the government and the major operators in Internet food trading, it is found, through simple static gaming, that a fine environment for the legitimate Internet food trading depends largely on the strict restraints imposed by the government supervision. In consideration of the limitations of the regulatory resources, however, a signal gaming model is then constructed, and a credit grading mechanism for high quality Internet food traders initiated by the government is set up to explore an effective supervision mechanism by the government for battling illegal speculations. The research shows that the government can effectively separate speculative operators from legitimate businesses and reduce speculative behavior by giving certain rewards to businesses who actively declare up to the standard. This reward is related to the camouflage cost of false declaration of compliance by speculators, the cost of actively declaring compliance by legitimate businesses and the punishment imposed by the government for speculative activities.
作者
王建华
钟丹丽
孙俊
Wan Jianhua;Zhong Danli;Sun Jun(School of Business,Jiangnan University)
出处
《宏观质量研究》
CSSCI
2020年第2期19-30,共12页
Journal of Macro-quality Research
基金
国家重点研发计划重点专项（2018YFC1603300）
国家重点研发计划重点专项（2018YFC1604000）
关键词
信息不对称
投机行为
信号博弈
信用分级机制
Information Asymmetry
Speculative Behavior
Signal Gaming
Credit Grading Mechanism
