摘要
激励和监督是公司治理最基本的重要手段,从这两方面入手探讨机构投资者持股、高管激励对大股东掏空抑制的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股不仅可以抑制大股东掏空行为,还可以增强高管激励的力度;此外,利用中介效应检验模型,还发现机构投资者抑制大股东掏空的路径,即机构投资者主要通过高管激励中介影响大股东掏空行为。研究结论可以丰富公司治理的研究问题,为解决现实中存在的大股东掏空行为提供借鉴。
Incentive and supervision are the most important and important means of corporate gover-nance.From these two aspects,this paper discusses the influence of institutional investors'shareholding and executive incentive on the tunneling inhibition of major shareholders.This paper finds that institu-tional ownership can not only restrain the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,but also enhance the motivation of senior executives.In addition,this paper uses the mediation effect test model,and also finds the way that institutional investors restrain the tunneling of major shareholders,that is,institution-al investors mainly influence the tunneling behavior of major shareholders through executive incentives.The research conclusion of this paper can enrich the research problems of corporate governance and provide reference for solving the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2020年第2期88-96,共9页
Financial Theory and Practice
基金
国家社科基金项目“掏空动机下大股东与高管合谋的形成机理及预警机制研究”（15BGL064）
广东省软科学项目“报酬契约、高管合谋与大股东掏空”（2017ZC0218）的阶段性研究成果
关键词
证券市场
机构投资者
高管激励
掏空
中介效应
stock market
institutional investors
executive incentives
tunneling
mediation effect
