摘要
对赌协议中合同自由与公司规制之间的逻辑边界,现行理论界和实务界对此仍未形成统一的共识,其争议焦点是在于公司实质参与对赌协议的合同安排是否紊乱了公司资本制度及治理结构,从而触及了公司法的效力性强制性规定。现有审判经验多着眼于原则上否定公司实质参与对赌协议的合法性,例外上允许公司在适当的情形下对股东违约责任承担连带责任。探求根源,其本质上即混淆了合同自由与公司规制的边界,存在以合同效力与履行为由,过度保护公司治理结构与资本制度稳定的法治陋弊。问题之纾解应着眼于对合同自由和公司规制的再剖析与新衡平,注重合同效力和履行的前置性判定,创新公司维持与救济的多渠道衡平,以及引入第三方中介机构的全流程评价,以更富有弹性的裁判机制塑造公司实质参与对赌协议的创新进路。
Concerning the logical boundary between freedom of contract and governance of company in the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism(VAM),the theoretical and practical circles have yet to form a unified consensus.The controversial focus is on whether a company's substantive participation in the VAM would disorder the company's capital system and governance structure,which,in turn,leads to the violation of the mandatory provisions of the company law.The existing trial experience mostly negates the validity of companies'substantive participation in the VAM,except allowing companies to assume joint liability for shareholder default obligations under appropriate circumstances.This mainly results from an essential blurring of the boundaries between contract freedom and corporate governance,and the overprotecting of the corporate governance structure and the stability of the capital system on the grounds of contract effectiveness and performance.The solution to the problem depends on a re-analysis of contract freedom,a re-balance of company governance,an emphasis on the preemptive judgment of contract effectiveness and performance,an innovation of the multi-channels of company maintenance and relief,and an introduction of an all-round evaluation process of third-party intermediaries,and a more flexible refereeing mechanism,so as to reshape the company's substantive participation in the VAM.
作者
李安安
范鑫
LI An'an;FAN Xin
出处
《中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2020年第1期51-68,共18页
Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
对赌协议
效力判定
合同自由
公司规制
Valuation Adjustment Mechanism
validity judgment
freedom of contract
governance of company