摘要
在传统的认识论中,信念的主体通常是单个的个人。但在日常语言与社会科学中,经常有大量的集体信念命题。目前在哲学界对于集体信念主要有三种研究模型:以奎恩顿为代表的多数人模型,以吉尔伯特为代表的共同承诺模型,以及以塞尔为代表的合作模型。这三种模型各擅胜场,但也都面临挑战与质疑。笔者建议,把"集体"再进一步细分为集合、机构与社群。集合是个人的松散组合;机构是建制化、结构化的整体;社群介乎二者中间。对集合的信念,基本可以适用于多数人模型;对于机构的信念,我们可以通过社会学调研的方法来了解其决策过程;对于社群的信念,可以用社会网络理论。
In traditional epistemology,we ascribe beliefs to individuals.However,in ordinary language and social sciences,there are a lot of group belief propositions.In philosophical literature,there are mainly three models about group belief:Anthony Quinton’s majority model,Margaret Gilbert’s jointly committed model,John Searle’s cooperation model.Every model has its own advantage,but meets criticism and challenges.The authors suggest analyzing the concept of group into three categories:aggregate,institution,and community.Aggregate is a loose combination of individuals;Institute is a structured and hierarchical unit;community is in the between.For aggregate beliefs,we can use majority model.For institution beliefs,we shall use sociological survey to find their decision procedure.For community beliefs,we may appeal to social network theory.
作者
朱佳慧
王巍
ZHU Jia-hui;WANG Wei(Department of History of Science,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期23-27,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
集体信念
集合
机构
社群
group belief
aggregate
institution
community
