摘要
既有企业持现文献主要关注企业整体的现金持有水平,忽视了现金在控制链上下游分布状况的重要影响。以2009-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,本文考察现金在母子公司间的分布与集团整体创新绩效的关系。研究发现,在集团整体持现水平一定的情况下,现金在母子公司间分布越分散(子公司持现比率越高),集团整体创新绩效越差。相对非国有产权,国有产权会加剧集团现金分散配置对创新绩效的不利影响。进一步研究表明,集团母公司股权适度集中、股权制衡、董事会独立性和管理层持股等内部治理机制的完善能够减轻集团现金分散配置对创新绩效的不利影响,但这些治理机制的有效性在不同所有制企业集团中存在一定的差异。研究结论对集团现金资源配置和创新管理具有重要启示。
In recent years, the high cash holdings of domestic and foreign enterprises have attracted the attention of scholars, and there have been a large number of literature discussing the motivations and economic consequences of high cash holdings. As the most liquid asset, cash holdings not only enable enterprises to directly resist the adverse impact of cash flow fluctuations, but also help enterprises to capture future investment opportunities, support the implementation of competitive strategies and enhance corporate value. For enterprise innovation, high cash holdings can provide financial guarantee for enterprise innovation activities and avoid innovation failures caused by insufficient capital investment. What’s more, cash holdings also help companies increase their responsiveness to technological innovation and help companies win in innovation competitions. However, more free cash flow also provides convenience and opportunities for management to seek private interests, such as on-the-job consumption, more welfare, and inefficient investment, etc. Therefore, there is still a lot of controversy about whether enterprises’ high cash holdings have real value.More importantly, most of the existing literature uses the aggregated financial data of the parent company and its subsidiaries, i.e. the cash balance of the consolidated statements, to examine the impact of the total cash holdings of all legal entities within the group. An important prerequisite for these studies is that there is no difference in the impact of the group cash distribution on the control chain on overall usage efficiency. Is this assumption really true in reality? The answer may be negative. Studies have found that the more a group’s cash dispersed in its subsidiaries, the lower the value of cash held by the group, and the more serious the over-investment. This suggests that there may be a special agency problem within the group, i.e. the principal-agent problem between the managements of the parent company and its subsidiaries. The existe
作者
娄祝坤
黄妍杰
陈思雨
Lou Zhukun;Huang Yanjie;Chen Siyu(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第12期202-212,共11页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目:“供应链合作中跨组织管控系统的学习与创新效应研究:伙伴选择与控制匹配视角”(项目编号:71702096,起止时间:2018.01-2020.12)
关键词
现金分布
创新绩效
产权性质
治理机制
cash distribution
innovation performance
ownership
governance mechanisms
