信息公开能抑制地方政府的举债行为吗?——基于中国地市级面板数据的实证分析被引量：6

Can Information Disclosure Restrain Local Governments’ Leveraging Behavior: Empirical Analysis Based on China Prefecture-level Panel Data

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摘要推动地方政府财政预决算信息全面公开,特别是政府债务信息公开,已成为有效管控地方政府债务风险、促进形成市场化融资自律机制的政策选项。选取2013—2016年中国地市级政府及其城投公司的相关面板数据,定量分析地方政府财政透明度是如何影响城投债的融资成本和债务规模。研究发现,在控制经济发展水平等多个影响因素之外,地方政府财政透明度越高,其城投公司在金融市场上的融资成本越低、城投公司的债务规模也越小。研究结论间接佐证了市场化融资自律机制值得倚重,推进财政信息全面公开有助于规范地方政府的举债行为。围绕财政信息公开、地方债市场化改革提出加强政府债务信息公开、建立市场化融资自律机制及抑制地方政府举债行为的政策建议。 Promoting the comprehensive disclosure of local governments'financial budget and final account information,especially the disclosure of government debt information has become a policy option to effectively control local governments'debt risk and promote the formation of market-oriented financing self-discipline mechanism.Based on the relevant panel data of China prefecture-level local governments and their urban investment companies from 2013 to 2016,this study quantitatively analyzes how the financial transparency of local governments affects the financing cost and debt scale of urban investment bonds.It is found that in addition to controlling the economic development level and other factors,the higher the financial transparency of local governments,the lower the financing cost of their urban investment companies in the financial market and the smaller the debt scale of these urban investment companies.The conclusion of the study indirectly proves that the self-discipline mechanism of market-oriented financing is worth relying on,and promoting the comprehensive disclosure of financial information is conducive to regulating local government's leveraging behavior.Focusing on financial information disclosure and local debt market-oriented reform,this study puts forward such policy suggestions as strengthening the disclosure of governments'debt information,establishing market-oriented financing self-discipline mechanism and restraining local government's leveraging behavior.

作者汪崇金崔凤 WANG Chongjin;CUI Feng(Institute of Financial and Economic Strategy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100028,China;School of International Economics and Trade,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)

机构地区中国社会科学院财经战略研究院对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院

出处《山东财经大学学报》 2020年第1期97-108,共12页 Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics

基金国家自然科学基金重大招标项目“我国经济高质量发展与产业结构调整升级研究”(71841015)

关键词地方政府债务财政透明度城投债融资成本债务规模 local government debt financial transparency urban investment bond financing cost debt scale

分类号 F812.5 [经济管理—财政学]