摘要
本文以2011-2015年中国A股上市公司为样本,基于更直接的监督与支持、更多的掏空两种效应,考察了纵向兼任高管对上市公司投资效率的影响及不同产权性质下影响的差异。研究发现,存在纵向兼任高管的上市公司,投资效率较低,且这种不利影响主要发生在非国有上市公司中,在控制内生性后,研究结论不变。进一步研究发现,纵向兼任高管对投资效率的不利影响主要存在于非国有上市公司的董事长兼任、兼任高管在大股东处担任主要职务时,且兼任强度越高,投资效率越低;纵向兼任高管加重了非国有上市公司的投资不足,其作用机制在于非国有上市公司的大股东通过纵向兼任高管加强了对上市公司的控制,引发了更为严重的掏空行为。本文的研究为证监会、国资委等监管部门完善纵向兼任高管、保护中小股东权益相关政策提供了实证支持。
Using Chinese A share listed companies from 2011 to 2015 as research samples,based on the more direct supervision and support,or more tunneling,this paper examines the effects of vertical interlocks of executives on the enterprise investment efficiency and the different effect in state owned and non state owned enterprises The paper finds that the investment efficiency of companies with vertical interlocks of executives is lower,and this effect mainly occurs in non state owned enterprises;after controlling endogeneity,the conclu sions are robust Further research indicates that the negative effect mainly exists in non state owned listed com panies with chairman vertical interlock,or to be chairman or CEO of the top shareholder;the higher the verti cal interlock intensity,the lower the investment efficiency;vertical interlocks of executive increases the under investment of non state owned listed companies,and the mechanism lies in that with vertical interlocks of executives,top shareholder strengths the controllership of the listed company,and leads to more serious tun neling This paper provides empirical support for CSRC,SASAC and other regulatory authorities to improve policies related to vertical interlocks of executives and minority shareholders interest protections.
作者
张桂玲
线婷婷
王林江
ZHANG Gui-ling;XIAN Ting-ting;WANG Lin-jiang
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期70-88,共19页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“货币政策传导效应中的社会资本作用机理研究”(项目编号:14BGL037)
教育部人文社会科学一般项目“财税政策协同、创新资源配置与公司价值创造”(项目编号:19YJA630048)
关键词
纵向兼任高管
投资效率
产权性质
代理问题
Vertical interlocks of executives
Investment efficiency
Ownership
Agency problem
