摘要
针对由多个竞争供应商和两个竞争零售商构成的供应链,供应商存在供应不确定,零售商拥有需求信息,供应商通过决策成本减少努力水平和批发价格来响应零售商需求信息.建立了一个多阶段博弈模型研究零售商垂直需求信息共享问题.结果表明,当努力成本系数充分小时,完全信息共享是一个均衡策略,即两个零售商会免费地与供应商共享需求信息.当努力成本系数充分大时,两个零售商在向供应商收取一定的费用后会与供应商共享需求信息.此外,在一定条件下,预测误差越小、努力成本系数越大、供应不确定程度越低、供应商数量越少、供应商的最优支付费用越多.
A supply chain composed of multiple competitive suppliers and two competitive retailers is studied,where suppliers’supply are uncertain and retailers have private demand information.The suppliers choose cost reduction efforts and the wholesale price to respond to the retailers’demand information.A multi-stage game model is set to investigate the retailers’vertical demand information sharing.The results show that when the cost coefficient of effort is small enough,complete information sharing is the equilibrium strategy,that is,the two retailers are willing to share information with the supplies for free.When the cost coefficient of effort is large enough,the two retailers are willing to share information with suppliers after charging a fee.Moreover,under some conditions,the smaller the forecast error,or the larger the cost coefficient of effort,or the lower the supply uncertainty,or the smaller the number of suppliers,the large the suppliers’optimal payment.
作者
吴军建
王海燕
Wu Junjian;Wang Haiyan(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第4期536-554,共19页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71531004)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71901114)
江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(GL18226)
关键词
供应不确定
成本减少努力
需求信息共享
竞争
supply uncertainty
cost reduction effort
demand information sharing
competition
