摘要
当风险规避的供应商面临着研发或制造成本的不确定性时,由供应商和采购方共同分担成本的激励契约相对于固定价格契约和成本加成契约而言更优。成本分担激励契约中不同的分担系数为供应商的研发努力提供了不同程度的激励。构建了一个风险中性的采购方和一个风险规避的供应商组成的二级供应链,分别分析了在信息对称和不对称情形下供应链中最优的成本分担线性激励契约,发现两种情形下最优契约中供应商的成本分担系数皆随成本不确定性的增加而减少,采购方对供应商的固定支付皆随成本不确定性的增加而增加;信息不对称情况下,供应商的成本分担系数低于信息对称情况下的成本分担系数。最后,通过算例对结论进行了说明。
The cost-sharing incentive contract performs better than the fixed-price contracts and cost-plus contracts when the risk-aversive supplier encounters the uncertainty of RD or manufacturing costs.The different cost-sharing coefficients in incentive contracts provide different degrees of incentive on the supplier＇s RD efforts.We build a two-echelon supply chain composed of a risk-neutral purchaser and a risk-aversive supplier,and analyze and compare the optimal cost-sharing linear contracts in the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information.The study shows that in optimal linear contracts,supplier＇s costsharing coefficients in both cases decreases with the increasing cost uncertainty,the fixed payment of the purchaser to the supplier increases along with the uncertainty of costs;in case of asymmetric information the supplier＇s cost-sharing coefficient is lower than in the case of symmetric information.The results are also illustrated by numerical examples.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期267-274,共8页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202140)
教育部人文社科基金青年项目(09YJC630208)
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(08ZXSJ039YB)
关键词
不对称信息
不确定性
成本分担
激励契约
asymmetric information
uncertainty
cost-sharing
incentive contract
