摘要
本文以"武汉中健银龄康复医院建设项目"为案例对社区养老设施邻避冲突中地方政府与公众作出的策略选择以及影响其策略选择的行为动机进行分析后发现,社区养老设施邻避冲突是一个动态演化的过程--地方政府为追求经济社会发展和社会稳定,在事件不同阶段的决策呈线性化;公众为表达利益诉求和不满情绪而作出的反应呈现与之对应的线性化,最终形成螺旋式上升的冲突。因此,应从转变观念、优化决策、复合型补偿等方面着手破解这种僵硬的线性化策略模式,实现社区养老设施邻避冲突的有效治理。
Based on the case of "Wuhan Zhongjian Yinling rehabilitation hospital construction project",this paper analyzes the strategic choice made by the local government and the public in the neighborhood conflict of community pension facilities and the behavioral motivation that affects their strategic choice.It is found that the neighborhood conflict of community pension facilities is a dynamic evolution process-in order to pursue economic(SOCIAL) development and social stability,the local government the decision-making in different stages is linearized,and the public’s resistance to express interest demands and dissatisfaction is linearized correspondingly,which eventually forms a spiral conflict.Therefore,we should change the concept,optimize the decision-making,compound compensation and other aspects to solve this rigid linear strategy mode,to achieve the effective governance of neighborhood conflicts in community pension facilities.
作者
景荣杰
许敏
Jing Rongjie;Xu Min
出处
《行政与法》
2019年第12期73-79,共7页
Administration and Law
基金
2014年国家社科基金青年项目“基于协商民主的邻避冲突治理模式研究”的阶段性成果，项目编号：14CGL037
关键词
社区养老设施
邻避冲突
邻避效应
邻避治理
community pension facilities
neighborhood conflict
neighborhood effect
neighborhood governance
