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农户信息水平、精英俘获与农村低保瞄准 被引量:52

Households’ Information, Elite Capture and Targeting the Poor in Rural China
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摘要 低保瞄准是实现扶贫资源精准投放的前提。本文使用2013年和2015年中国家庭金融调查数据估算了中国农村的低保瞄准效率,发现农村地区低保救助资源不足、瞄准偏误较大、存在明显的精英俘获现象。其次,本文基于分权制社区瞄准方式下基层政府的效用函数,构建了分析农村低保瞄准的理论框架,引入农户信息水平因素研究低保瞄准。实证结果显示,农户的信息水平对低保瞄准具有显著影响。在村内设置宣传公示栏,提高农户的信息水平,会减轻乡村内部的信息不对称,从而改善低保瞄准效率。最后,本文对农户信息水平如何影响低保瞄准进行了异质性分析。研究发现,在地理环境恶劣、信息传播难度大的地区,农户信息水平更能减少低保瞄准偏误,这验证了信息传播的通知作用;在具有宗族势力、精英俘获更严重的村庄,农户信息水平更能改善低保瞄准效率,这验证了信息反馈的监督作用。 Summary:Anti-poverty initiatives are the core strategy for the development of rural China.China s rural minimum living allowance system(Dibao System)is an essential part of various anti-poverty policies.The success of this program depends on accurately targeting the poor.Targeting bias reduces the effectiveness of poverty alleviation,and targeting efficiency is related to the efficiency of fiscal funding.Misallocation of Dibao funds would be a great waste of public resources and may even cause social discontent,intensify the unequal distribution of wealth,and result in major social contradictions.In this context,this study addresses the following questions.What is the targeting efficiency of China s Dibao system?Is there elite capture in the implementation of Dibao policy?How do rural elites intercept resources?Whether and how does the information about rural households and information asymmetry within villages affect the targeting efficiency of the Dibao system?To answer these questions,we use data from 2013 and 2015 China s Household Finance Survey to estimate the targeting efficiency of the Dibao system in rural China.In doing so,we generate several important findings.First,Dibao funds are not sufficient.The incidence of rural poverty is 35.75%,but only 9.24%of rural households receive the minimum living allowances.Second,targeting errors are quite large,with an exclusion error rate of 84.40%and an inclusion error rate of 39.67%.Third,there is obvious elite capture in the implementation of the Dibao policy.About 30%of Dibao funds are transferred to high-income households in rural areas.After this preliminary analysis,we use the utility function of grass-roots government under the decentralized community targeting mode to construct a theoretical framework to analyze the targeting process,and consider how households information affects the targeting efficiency of the Dibao system.Ordinary least squares and Tobit models are applied to investigate the factors that influence the efficiency of Dibao targeting.The re
作者 何欣 朱可涵 HE Xin;ZHU Kehan(China Household Finance Survey and Research Center,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics;School of Finance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第12期150-164,共15页 Economic Research Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71803155,71873108) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目项目(批准号:18YJC790043) 高等学校学科创新引智计划项目(编号B16040) 四川省社科规划重大项目项目(批准号:SC17ZD03)的资助
关键词 低保瞄准 信息不对称 精英俘获 农村低保制度 Targeting the Poor Information Asymmetry Elite Capture Dibao System
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