摘要
本文结合中国资本市场的特殊情境,结合代理理论和信息不对称理论,探讨企业研发费用与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现,研发费用与企业未来股价崩盘风险正相关,这一关系在管理层持股比例较高、企业与外部投资者信息不对称程度较低的情况下有所缓解。研究表明,研发活动的风险收益特征容易成为管理层为追求个人利益而做出机会主义行为的对象,而创新活动的隐秘性带来的信息不对称问题增大了管理层利用研发费用隐瞒负面消息的动机和空间,从而提高企业未来股价崩盘风险。本文有助于提醒管理层从投资者利益出发,真正实现研发活动应有的价值,对如何降低股价崩盘风险、促进资本市场健康发展也具有重要意义。
This paper investigates the relationship between R&D expenses and stock price crash risk based on agency cost and asymmetric information theory under Chinese unique institutional background.The findings show that,with more R&D expenses,the probability of stock price crash risk increases more.Additionally,with the increase of the management shareholding ratio and the information transparency,the probability of stock price crash risk caused by R&D expenses is alleviated to some degree.The above findings suggest that R&D activities become the management’s self-interest tool caused by agency conflicts,and the existence of information asymmetry provides good opportunity for management to grab their self-interest,which aggravate the stock price crash risk.This paper will provide some theoretical reference for management to enhance the value of R&D activities based on investor interest perspectives,and it will be of great significance to reduce stock price crash risk and promote the sustainable development of capital market.
作者
杨鸣京
程小可
高升好
Mingjing Yang;Xiaoke Cheng;Shenghao Gao
出处
《中国会计评论》
2019年第3期429-462,共34页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71872010,71572009)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(16YJC 630024)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
研发费用
管理层持股
信息透明度
股价崩盘风险
R&D Expense
Management Shareholding
Information Transparency
Stock Price Crash Risk
