摘要
由于新进入售电公司的“吸脂效应”,原在位者保底服务的供应存在困难。在分析售电公司“吸脂效应”基础上,建立提供保底服务的原在位供电商和新进入供电商的供给需求函数,分别就城市地区统一定价和城市地区完全市场化两种模式建立博弈供给模型,并求解相应的均衡解。本模型对于新一轮电力体制下国内保底服务的规则设计具有一定参考价值。
Due to the existence of the“cream skimming”of the new company,the supply of default service from the original electricity company has become difficult.Based on the analysis of the“cream skimming”,this paper firstly establishs the supply de mand function of the original in position power supplier that provids the default service and the new entry power supplier.Then we discuss two mechanisms,the unified pricing of the urban area and the complete marketization of the urban area separately.Final ly,the game supply model is established and solve the equilibrium solution of the response.This model has certain referencing value for the rule design of domestic default service under the new round of power system.
作者
李琥
李冰洁
赵宏大
林凯颖
王蓓蓓
LI Hu;LI Bingjie;ZHAO Hongda;LIN Kaiying;WANG Beibei(Economic Research Institute of Jiangsu State Grid Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Nanjing 210008,China;School of Electrical Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China)
出处
《电力需求侧管理》
2019年第6期65-69,共5页
Power Demand Side Management
基金
江苏省电力公司管理咨询项目“新电改环境下电网公司公益性保底服务的运营策略”~~
关键词
保底服务
博弈模型
吸脂效应
统一定价
完全市场化
default service
game model
cream skimming
unified pricing
complete marketization
