摘要
针对外包产业中各企业承担社会责任的现实问题,采用博弈理论,研究了代工企业和供应商分别承担企业社会责任(CSR)时,供应链各成员在自行控制和委托代理两类外包模式下的决策优化问题。研究结果表明,在两种外包模式下,无论哪一方承担企业社会责任,都有利于提高社会福利以及增加OEM、代工企业和系统整体利润;当供应商承担企业社会责任时,OEM选择自行控制外包模式更有利;当代工企业承担企业社会责任时,OEM最有利外包模式的选择取决于企业社会责任成本系数和企业社会责任敏感系数。
Aiming at the realistic problem of social responsibility of each enterprise in outsourcing industry, this paper uses game theory to study the decision-making optimization of supply chain members under two outsourcing modes of Control and Delegation when the CM and suppliers undertake corporate social responsibility separately. It is found that under the two outsourcing modes, no matter which party under takes corporate social responsibility, it is beneficial to improve social welfare and increase the overall profit of OEM, CM and system;when the supplier undertakes corporate social responsibility, OEM chooses to control outsourcing by itself. The model is more favorable;when the CM undertakes corporate social re sponsibility. the choice of OEMs most favorable outsourcing model depends on the cost coefficient of corporate social responsibility and the sensitivity coefficient of corporate social responsibility.
作者
李丹
马骋
孙琦
林欢
LI Dan;MA Cheng;SUN Qi;LIN Huan(College of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China)
出处
《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2019年第3期110-122,共13页
Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金(批准号:11401331,11671220)资助
教育部人文社科资助项目(批准号:18YJC630119)资助
中国博士后面上项目(批准号:2016M592148)资助
山东省高校人才社会科学项目(批准号:J17RA107)资助
山东省博士后创新基金(批准号:201603063)资助
关键词
外包模式
企业社会责任
博弈论
三层供应链
outsourcing model
corporate social responsibility
game theory
three-tier supply chain
