摘要
本文从策略博弈的视角,实证考察供应商企业在与客户的竞合博弈过程中对财务杠杆的策略性使用。实证研究发现,供应商企业在与客户的博弈过程中,策略性地运用财务杠杆对客户“恩威并施”,实证结果表明客户集中度与财务杠杆之间存在明显的正U型关系:一方面,当客户集中度处在较低阶段时,为了吸引和诱导客户进行关系型投资,供应商企业通过降低财务杠杆向客户“示好”;另一方面,当客户集中度处在较高阶段时,为了防范“客大欺店”的“敲竹杠”风险,提升自身议价能力,供应商企业又策略性地选择高财务杠杆向客户“示威”。进一步研究发现,企业间的信任水平、供应商企业的市场势力以及供应商企业所处的行业特征等,对供应商企业在与其客户博弈过程中对财务杠杆的策略性使用具有明显的调节效应。
Based on the competitive and cooperative game relationship between supplier enterprises and customers, this paper empirically examines the relationship between customer concentration and supplier enterprises’ choice of financial leverage from the perspective of strategic game, in order to test whether supplier enterprises use financial leverage strategically in the process of game with their customers. Empirical research finds that there is a significant positive U-shaped relationship between customer concentration and financial leverage, which reflects that supplier enterprises use financial leverage strategically to use "both carrot and stick approach" in the process of game with their customers. On the one hand, when customer concentration is at a low stage, in order to attract and induce customers to conduct relationships. On the other hand, when customer concentration is at a higher stage, in order to prevent the "rip-off" risk of "big customer fraudulent stores" and enhance their bargaining power, supplier enterprises strategically choose high financial leverage to "demonstrate" to customers. The results of robustness test by PSM and two-stage instrumental variable method remain unchanged. Further research finds that the strategic use of financial leverage only exists when the level of trust among enterprises is low, the market power of supplier enterprises is weak, and the product uniqueness of supplier enterprises is low, but when the level of trust among enterprises is high, the market power of supplier enterprises is strong, and suppliers are weak. When the product uniqueness is high, the strategic use of financial leverage disappears. On the one hand, this paper expands the research perspective of the strategic effect of financial leverage;on the other hand, it extends the research content of the strategic effect of financial leverage, which has a certain marginal contribution in theory. At the same time, the conclusion of this paper provides a certain degree for supplier enterprises to make reasonab
作者
况学文
林鹤
陈志锋
Kuang Xuewen;Lin He;Chen Zhifeng(School of Economics & Management, Nanchang University;School of Management, Xiamen University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期44-55,共12页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目（71462025、71862024）资助
关键词
财务杠杆
客户集中度
策略博弈
利益相关者
Financial Leverage
Customer Concentration
Strategic Game
Stakeholder
