摘要
基于双边市场的三个客观现象,即(1)平台维系用户的成本不同导致了不同类型用户对平台的利润贡献率不同;(2)BBPD 是双边平台普遍采用的一种定价策略;(3)用户在同一双边平台进行多次交易,本文构建了一个完全垄断双边平台的两期动态博弈模型,通过分析运营成本对用户进入价格、市场份额、平台利润的影响,研究双边平台不同运营成本用户的管理问题,并分析用户成本差异化对平台定价策略的影响。研究发现:仅HPC-B,CC-B,HPC-N和CC-N情况下平台第一期利润与高低成本系数呈现 U 型关系;当成本差异化程度较小时,CC-B,HPC-N和CC-N情形下平台第一期利润与高低成本系数呈现单调递增。
Three facts are observed in the two-sided platform, which is an increasing prevalence of the business model. First, customers in the platforms differ in their cost to serve. Some customers tend to be considerably more costly to serve than others. Intuitively, a less costly customer is more profitable than one being much costly. Second, behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) is a commonly used strategy in e-commerce platforms, such as in Amazon, JD, TMALL, VIP, and so on. Third, consumers always make several times transactions in one platform. These observations address several questions.(1) An assumption that operation costs are usually normalized to zero in the traditional single-side market is valid because it has no effect on the equilibrium results. Does this assumption still work when a two-sided platform chooses BBPD?(2) If the assumption doesn’t work, how will it affect equilibrium price, the profit of platform, and pricing strategy?(3) How will operation cost affect consumer acquisition and retention?(4) How does the two-sided platform manage the high- and low-cost customers? Our paper is like Shin et al.’s (2012) study. However, there are four differences. First, Shin et al.(2012) build on the traditional single-side market and does not consider network externality, especial cross-network externality, but ours has. Second, Shin et al.(2012) focus on the impact of different operation costs on the firm’s profits, while ours concentrates on the choice of pricing strategies, uniform pricing or BBPD.(3) Shin et al.’s (2012) study assume that high- and low-cost consumers share the same maximum quantities, while ours assumes that high- and low-cost consumers have different maximum quantities.(4) Shin et al.(2012) conclude that it is optimal for firms to fire some of its high-cost customers, even some profitable customers, while Subramanian et al.(2014) obtains an opposite result, that is, firms should keep its high-cost consumers. Our paper incorporates these two opposite results into a model. We co
作者
张凯
董远山
ZHANG Kai;DONG Yuan-shan(Institute of Management and Decision,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China;School of Economic and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第3期153-161,共9页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
中国博士后基金特别资助项目(2014T70232)
中国博士后基金面上资助项目(2013M530890)
山西省优秀青年学术带头人项目(2015052005)
山西省回国留学人员科研资助项目(2015-024)
山西省高校“131”领军人才工程(2016052007)
