摘要
考虑个体有限理性特征,基于前景理论构建众包物流参与者感知收益博弈矩阵。从发货方视角,推理出众包物流配送方发挥较高努力水平的条件。通过引入保价制度,建立保价条件下配送方的行为决策模型,并运用数值仿真技术验证模型的有效性。结果发现:(1)配送方的努力成本、不努力的收入、处罚力度等指标直接影响其努力水平;(2)配送方努力工作的成本前景值要小于受到处罚与不努力收入前景值之和,同时要小于努力工作时所得的收益;(3)保价金额变动在一定条件下会影响配送方的努力水平,但是并不能达到完全控制的目的,甚至造成负面影响。因此在保价基础上,发货方可以通过增加监测力度或者加大处罚力度,有效保证配送方的努力水平。
Considering the bounded rationality of individuals,this paper constructs the perceived benefit game matrix based on the prospect theory and deduces the condition that makes the shippers play a higher level of effort from the view of consumers.The system of insured price is introduced to establish the decision-making model of the shipper’s behavior and the numerical simulation is used to verify the effectiveness of the model.The results show that:firstly,the cost of the shippers,income without efforts and penalties directly affect the level of its efforts;secondly,the cost value for distribution efforts is less than the sum of the penalties and the unskilled income outlook,while less than the proceeds of hard work;thirdly,changes in the amount of insurance premiums will affect the level of shippers’ efforts under certain conditions.However,it does not achieve the purpose of full control of it or even have a negative impact.Therefore,based on the insured price,consumers can ensure the effort level effectively by increasing process supervision or increasing intensifying punishment of shippers.
作者
李玉
吴斌
王超
LI Yu;WU Bin;WANG Chao(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Tech University,Nanjing 211816,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第6期129-135,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
江苏省社科基金项目(18GLD005)
国家自然科学基金项目(71671089)
关键词
前景理论
众包物流
努力水平
演化博弈
prospect theory
crowdsourcing logistics
effort level
evolution game
