摘要
本文建立了监管部门和认证机构的静态演化博弈模型,得出了结论:当监管部门查处认证机构所带来的正面效用越大,越倾向于进行监管;并对监管能力提升提出了对策,对于强化对认证机构的监管具有重要意义。
This paper establishes a static game model between supervision authorities and certification bodies,and draws the conclusion that the greater the positive effect on the investigation and treatment of certification bodies by supervision authorities,the more the supervision authorities are inclined to supervise.It also puts forward countermeasures to improve the supervision capacity,which is of great significance to strengthen the supervision of certification bodies.
作者
左兆迎
王以宪
ZUO Zhao-ying;WANG Yi-xian(Rizhao Inspection & Certification Company)
出处
《中国标准化》
2019年第9期129-132,共4页
China Standardization
关键词
国家监管
认证机构
静态博弈
national supervision
certification body
static game
