摘要
在效用最大化目标下,通过构建消费者、房地产商和政府官员的一般均衡理论模型,证明了政府官员效用的大小取决于地方竞争的程度,而地方竞争的程度对土地财政有着正向推动作用。采用全国31个地区2000-2016年数据,实证分析发现在控制地方经济发展程度的情况下,地方竞争和财政分权对土地财政有着显著的正向推动作用,建议降低地方政府对土地收入的依赖性。
This paper gives the conclusion that the utility of government officers is decided by the local competitive power according to the general equilibrium model on the premise that the utility maximum aim of consumer, realtors and government officers is achieved. The local competitive power has positive effect on the land finance. The conclusion that the local competitive power and fiscal decentralization has positive effect on the land finance in the situation of that the aim of economic growth is controlled by local government is proved by the panel data of 31 provinces area from 2000 to 2016. This paper has given a suggestion to reduce local government's dependence on land revenue at the end.
作者
胡娟
陈挺
HU Juan;CHEN Ting(school of economics and management,Anhui Normal University, Wuhu Anhui 241002;State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing 102201)
出处
《安徽师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期84-90,共7页
Journal of Anhui Normal University(Hum.&Soc.Sci.)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71373031)
安徽师范大学博士科研启动基金项目(2017XJJ08)
关键词
土地财政
地方竞争
财政分权
晋升
the land finance
the local competitive
fiscaldecentralization
government officer promotion
