摘要
如何有效地激励高管人员、降低代理成本历来受到理论界和实务界的高度重视。已有的研究多将立足点置于业绩考核指标的合理性以及薪酬业绩敏感性的影响因素维度,忽略了企业风险承担的角色和功能。区别于以往文献,本文尝试检验企业风险承担水平在高管薪酬契约制定过程中的作用。分析2005—2016年中国资本市场A股上市公司数据发现:(1)控制经营业绩后,企业风险承担水平同高管薪酬之间显著正相关,呈现出风险补偿效应;(2)伴随高管风险厌恶程度的上升,高管薪酬的风险补偿效应增强;(3)在更为有效的经理人市场环境中,高管薪酬的风险补偿效应较高。以上结果表明,除经营业绩外,企业风险承担是高管薪酬的重要内在影响因素,但是其作用大小会受限于高管风险厌恶程度和经理人市场环境等内外部情境因素。据此,本文认为未来在制定高管薪酬时,企业应将风险承担水平纳入考虑范畴,并需要进一步针对所处的不同内外部情境加以调整。补充测试结果揭示,高管薪酬在企业风险承担影响公司价值的过程中发挥了部分中介作用,支持了将企业风险承担因素融入高管薪酬契约制定中的合理性。本文有助于厘清企业风险承担在高管薪酬契约制定中的作用,增进了对基于风险承担视角如何改善薪酬契约有效性这一问题的理解和认识。
How to make top management incentive more effective and decrease agency cost has attracted high attention from both of theory and practice cycle. The existing studies has focused on the rationality dimension of performance evaluation and influences of compensation-performance sensitivity, and ignored the role and function of corporate risk taking. Distinguishing from previous literature, the article tries to test the role of corporate risk taking in the process of executive compensation contracts making. Analyzing A-share listed companies data from2005 to 2016 in China’s capital market, the results show that:(1)After controlling operation performance, there is a significant positive correlation between risk taking level and executive compensation in presence of risk offset effect.(2)As risk aversion of top management strengthens, risk offset effect of executive compensation increases.(3) Risk offset effect of executive compensation is higher in effective manager market environment. The above results indicate that risk taking is an important inherent influence factor of executive compensation besides operation performance, and the effects are limited by internal and external situational factors like risk aversion of top management and manager market, et al. It is supposed to incorporate risk taking level into the process of setting executive compensation in future, and adjust according to inside and outside environment further. Further supplementary test shows that executive compensation plays partial mediation effect between risk taking and corporate value, which supports the rationality of incorporating corporate risk taking into compensation contracts decision process. The article clarifies the role of risk taking in executive compensation contracts and helps us understand and recognize how to enhance executive compensation contracts effectiveness from risk taking perspective.
作者
周泽将
马静
胡刘芬
ZHOU Ze-jiang;MA Jing;HU Liu-fen(School of Business, Anhui University;School of Management, Xiamen University)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期152-169,共18页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"本地任职
政治关联与企业财务行为:中国关系情境中独立董事视角的理论构建与实证检验"(批准号71772001)
国家自然科学基金青年项目"女性高管
会计行为与投资决策"(批准号71302113)
国家自然科学基金青年项目"联合风险投资:行为动机
伙伴选择及绩效研究"(批准号71502001)
关键词
高管薪酬
企业风险承担
风险厌恶
经理人市场
公司价值
executive compensation
corporate risk taking
risk aversion
manager market
corporate value