摘要
通常认为,将高管薪酬与公司业绩联系起来,是缓解委托代理矛盾的重要手段,且薪酬与业绩的关系愈密切,激励效果愈好。近年来实证研究表明,高管出于"自利"目的,会利用管理层权力降低薪酬—业绩敏感性。然而,薪酬—业绩敏感性的降低仅源于管理层权力的滥用吗?它是否也符合了股东利益?本文利用我国上市公司数据实证研究发现,企业风险对我国高管薪酬—业绩敏感性有抑制作用,有利于降低高管道德风险行为发生的概率,基于风险视角,降低薪酬-业绩敏感性是符合股东利益的。同时,研究得出,国有企业的政治关系与高管的非薪酬补偿使得国有企业高管薪酬对企业风险不敏感;中央国有企业具有的一定垄断性与较大的企业规模,进一步降低了其高管薪酬对风险的敏感性。
The separation of ownership and management making large-scale socialized production becomes pos- sible, and promoting the rapid development of the economy, but it also brings the principal-agent problem. Many scholars believe that link executive pay and company performance is a way to mitigate principal-agent conflicts, and the more closely the relationship between executives＇ pay and performance, the better the incentive effect. But in re- cent years, empirical studies have shown that, incentive pay for executives does not necessarily solve the agency problems. For ＂self-serving＂ purposes, executives greatly influence and even determine their own remuneration, so that the mechanisms of the formulation and implementation of remuneration will become the agency problem. That is to say, executives are inclined to make use of the powers of management to reduce the executives＇ pay-performance sensitivity, as a result, the mechanisms of the formulation and implementation remuneration to become part of the a- gency problem. The performance of executives to manipulate the remuneration contract is： lower the pay-perform- ance sensitivity for the purpose of reducing the risk of their own remuneration, which separates the relationship be- tween performance and remuneration in compensation contract. However, is the reduction of the executives＇ pay-per- formance sensitivity only derived from the management of power abuse？ Is lowering pay-performance sensitivity also in line with the interests of shareholders？ What effect will enterprise risk characteristics have on executives＇ pay-per- formance sensitivity？ What effect do China＇s state-owned enterprises＇ social responsibility affects executives＇ pay- performance sensitivity？ From the existing literature,these issues have not taken seriously enough. Based on 2003 ~ 2011 sample period, this paper studies this series of questions and finds that, enterprise risk prohibits executive pay- performance sensitivity, and higher business risk
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期54-61,共8页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"转型经济背景下我国企业员工收入差距研究"(11CJY025)
国家自然科学基金项目"公司职工薪酬成本的影响因素
产出效应与控制策略研究"(71172221/G0206)
关键词
薪酬-业绩敏感性
企业风险
产权性质
pay-performance sensitivity
enterprise risk
nature of property rights
