摘要
本文试图从理论层面探讨以往政府控房价效果欠佳的主要原因,并且从重构地方政府激励机制的视角提出构建房价调控长效机制的新思路。本文构建了以中央政府为委托人、以地方政府为代理人、包括促增长和控房价两项任务的委托—代理模型。研究结果表明:以往控房价效果欠佳的主要逻辑在于,中央政府对地方政府的考核侧重于经济增长,忽视了对房价的考核,导致地方政府缺少控房价的激励。不仅如此,在经济面临较为严峻的下行压力时,中央政府本身也缺乏控房价的激励,导致其出台的政策缺乏连续性和可置信性,这进一步弱化了地方政府控房价的激励。在此基础上,本文提出了构建房价调控长效机制的两点建议:一是将房价增速纳入中央对地方政府的考核体系,并且注重体现"因城施策"的调控思路;二是中央政府应该将房价调控独立于宏观调控,以确保中央政府控房价政策的长期稳定性和可置信性。
This paper tries to probe into the main reason why the governments control the house price ineffectively in the past from the theory level,and puts forward the new way of constructing the long-term mechanism of house price control from the perspective of reconstructing the incentive mechanism of the local government.For this reason,this paper builds a principal-agent model that takes the central government as the principal and the local government as the agent,and includes two tasks:promoting economic growth and controlling house price.The results show that the main logic behind the poor effect of house price control in the past is that the central government’s assessment of local government focuses on economic growth and ignores the evaluation of house price,resulting in the lack of motivation for local government to control house price.Not only that,when the economy is facing more severe downward pressure,the central government itself lacks incentives to control house price,resulting in a lack of consistency and credibility of its policies.This further weakens the incentive for local governments to control house price.Based on the conclusion of the model,this paper put forwards two suggestions for long-term mechanism of house price control.First,house price should be included in the assessment system of the central government for local governments,and reflect the thought of“different policies for different cities”.Second,the central government should keep house price control independent of macro control,so as to ensure the long-term stability and credibility of the central government’s house price control policy.
作者
陈小亮
李三希
陈彦斌
CHEN Xiao-liang;LI San-xi;CHEN Yan-bin(Institute of Economics CASS, Beijing 100836,China;School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第11期79-97,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"‘债务-通缩’风险与货币政策财政政策协调的定量研究"(批准号71603274)
国家自然科学基金青年项目"预期管理提高中国货币政策有效性的理论机制与政策研究"(批准号71703179)
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目"高管声音具有市场价值吗--基于中国3C会议的分析研究"(批准号18YJC790214)
关键词
激励机制
长效机制
多任务委托-代理模型
因城施策
incentive mechanism
long-term mechanisms
multi-task principal-agent model
different policies for different cities
