摘要
文章基于资产专用性理论和CAPM模型,以2002-2016年上市公司高管为样本,对薪酬溢价的形成机制进行了探讨,发现高管薪酬溢价主要源于因人力资本专用性导致的失业风险及其所承担的企业风险。这为薪酬差距问题提供了新的解释:高管之所以获得较高的报酬是因为承担了更多风险。研究还发现与国有企业相比,非国有企业的薪酬体系更多的考虑了企业风险,因而更高效。公司治理水平对"风险-溢价"的正相关性有显著的调节作用。因此,改进和完善公司治理结构,是降低企业内部风险,提高薪酬激励有效性的重要保证。
Using the theory of asset specificity and CAPM,taking the executives in listed companies from 2002 to 2016 as the samples,this paper analyzes the formation process of human capital premium,and finds that executives compensation premium mainly depends on the unemployment risk and the corporate risk caused by the asset specificity of human capital.The study provides a new explanation for the salary gap:Executives get much higher compensation because they take more risks than the ordinary staff do.Moreover,the paper discovers that the compensation system of non-state-owned enterprises,compared with state-owned enterprises,is more efficient because it takes more corporate risks into consideration.The level of corporate governance has a significant moderating effect on the positive correlation of“risk-premium”.Therefore,the improvement of corporate governance structure is an important guarantee to reduce the internal risk and enhance the effectiveness of compensation incentive.
作者
周蕾
周萍华
刘锦妹
ZHOU Lei;ZHOU Ping-hua;LIU Jin-mei(School of Accounting,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China)
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期141-150,共10页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL076)
