摘要
本文以2007—2016年在沪、深交易所上市的A股公司为样本,实证检验风险投资机构持股对企业后续融资约束的缓解作用、内在机理及影响路径。研究表明,风险投资机构有助于减轻企业的融资约束程度,不同特征的风险投资机构对融资约束的缓解作用存在显著差异。风险投资对企业融资行为的影响机理在于,风险投资机构不仅对企业价值具有客观上的认证作用,而且主动帮助企业与市场中介机构建立良好的合作关系,有效缓解了外部投资者与企业之间的信息不对称。此外,风险投资机构还积极参与企业的投后管理,从而有力化解了委托代理冲突。由风险投资对企业融资的影响路径分析可知,风险投资持股有助于企业以较低的成本在资本市场上筹集更多发展所需的资金,帮助企业克服过度依赖信贷资金的失衡的融资结构,增强了企业在股权市场上的融资效率以及对价值链企业的谈判能力。本文的研究意义不仅在于丰富了风险投资和融资约束领域的文献,还有助于人们深入理解风险投资与企业行为之间的互动关系。
Financing constraint is a common problem in the development of enterprises.How to mitigate financing constraints is significant for improving corporate investment efficiency,reducing operating costs and promoting national economy.The main factors leading to financing constraints include information asymmetry and principal-agent conflict between companies and external investors.Scholars mainly seek ways to ease corporate financing constraints based on how to reduce the information asymmetry.Companies can actively report information related to investors decision-making and improve the quality of information disclosure to deepen outsiders understanding of the company.Market intermediaries building a communication bridge between the company and capital holders search for private data or disseminate the publicly disclosed information,which also help investors to make more accurately judgments on the firm value and further promote financing efficiency.However,the reduction of information asymmetry depends not only on the company s initiative in disclosing and intermediary agencies disseminating information,but also on whether and to what extent the information is trusted by investors.In fact,enterprise insiders are motivated enough to hide or delay disclosure of bad news or even directly report false information in order to obtain lower-cost capital,but the possibility of this behavior being punished is very small in the context of imperfect legal systems.As long as outside investors are rational,they will surely realize that there is inconsistency between their own information sets and insiders.This makes capital holders refuse to fund enterprises or ask for higher returns as risk compensation,resulting in the issue of corporate financing constraints.This stalemate of information asymmetry will eventually lead to shrinking of capital markets,unless there is at least a third-party organization able to certify the value of companies.Venture capital firms happen to have this kind of authentication function.In addition to
作者
胡刘芬
周泽将
HU Liu-fen;ZHOU Ze-jiang(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei,Anhui,230601,China)
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第7期91-109,共19页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"联合风险投资:行为动机
伙伴选择及绩效研究"(71502001)
国家自然科学基金项目"本地任职
政治关联与企业财务行为:中国关系情境中独立董事视角的理论构建与实证"(71772001)
关键词
风险投资
融资约束
作用机理
影响路径
venture capital
financing constraint
functioning mechanism
influencing path
