摘要
跨大西洋金融监管协调的结果为什么在一些情况下向欧盟的偏好靠拢,而在另一些情况下更为接近美国的偏好?为解释这一差异,需要在探讨既有文献提出的欧盟内部一致性和市场规模因素的基础上,引入金融危机背景下不对称脆弱性导致的讨价还价权力变化这一政治逻辑。美国作为此轮金融危机的发源地,在危机后强化监管,导致其在全球金融市场中处于竞争劣势;为抵消其竞争劣势,美国积极向世界其他区域推广其更为严格的监管标准,这使美国对监管协调失败的结果具有脆弱性;美国面临的脆弱性赋予了欧盟在跨大西洋金融监管协调中更多的讨价还价权力。在金融危机后讨价还价权力对比发生变化的背景下,美国提出的标准能否成为国际标准,取决于该标准对欧盟是否产生净损害以及欧盟内部能否针对该标准达成一致立场。外国银行机构规则、国际处置机制、资本要求和流动性规则三个案例的比较研究验证了上述假说。
This article asks the question why financial regulatory coordination across the Atlantic resulted in standards closer to the EU preferences in some cases,and produced outcomes favoring the U.S.preferences in others.It considers internal factors of intra-EU cohesiveness and the power of market size,and introduces a political logic that asymmetric vulnerability resulting from the global financial crisis reshapes the distribution of the jurisdictions bargaining power,with a view to explaining the variance in coordination outcomes.This article argues that the U.S.,where the crisis emanated from,responded to the shock by tightening its regulation,and therefore landed in a less competitive position in the global financial market;to counter this disadvantage,it endeavored to promote its more stringent standards elsewhere in the world,making itself vulnerable to coordination failure;its vulnerability rendered its European counterpart more bargaining power in transatlantic financial regulatory coordination;in this context of changed distribution of bargaining power after the crisis,whether the U.S.-proposed rules could become global depends on two factors-whether the rules incur net costs on the EU,and whether intra-EU agreement can be reached on the rules.This proposition is tested through three cases,the rules on Foreign Banking Organizations(FBOs)of the Dodd-Frank Act,the international resolution regimes,and the capital and liquidity requirements.
作者
刘宏松
徐悦
Liu Hongsong;Xu Yue
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期131-154,160,共25页
World Economics and Politics
基金
2014年上海市曙光计划项目"中国的全球治理倡议与国际制度建制及改制研究"(项目编号:SG14030)
2015年霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基础性研究项目"倡议与塑造:中国在全球治理中的新角色研究"(项目编号:151093)
2016年国家哲学社会科学基金重大项目"人类命运共同体与全球治理研究"(项目编号:2015YZD09)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
国际金融监管协调
金融危机
讨价还价权力
监管标准
international regulatory coordination
financial crisis
bargaining power
regulatory standard
