摘要
元伦理学研究中的一项重要议题就是确定伦理陈述的属性。在这方面,存在着情感性的非认知与描述性的认知两种看法。布莱克本在确定伦理陈述的属性时,既继承了情感主义,坚持非认知立场,又接受了某种意义上的实在论观点,以避免情感主义解释"成真性"问题时的困境。基于布莱克本的这种"准实在论"观点,通过分析非认知主义和道德判断之间存在的关系,表明与认知的实在论相比,这种观点无需进行形而上学层面的那种预设,就能很好地解释混合世界的非存在性。客观地讲,这其中所蕴含的伦理非认知主义,使布莱克本的那种实在论在弗雷格-吉奇难题的解答上表现出特定的优越性。
An important issue in the study of meta-ethics is to determine the properties of ethics statement.In this regard,there are non-cognitive emotional stance and cognitive descriptive stance.Blackburn in determining the properties of ethics statement,not only inherited the emotionalism,adhered to the cognitive standpoint,but also accepted a sense of realism,to avoid the dilemma that emotionalism encountered in the process of explaining the“truth-maker”problem.This paper,based on his view of the“quasi-realism”,by analyzing the relationship between the non-cognitivism and moral judgments,shows that compared with the cognitive realism,the“quasi-realism”can well explain the non-existence of the mixed world without the assumption in the sense of metaphysics.Objectively speaking,the ethic non-cognitionism that here entailed,makes Blackburn,s realism has some superiority in the solution of Frege-G-each problem.
作者
王航赞
王彦方
WANG Hangzan;WANG Yanfang(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2018年第4期19-23,共5页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
