摘要
博弈理论进入国际关系学者的视野后,很快成为分析国际冲突与合作的一种有效方法,许多国际关系理论的学者都曾广泛使用博弈方法论证有关国际制度的构建与维持等问题。这为我们分析包括国际立法的谈判与构建、各个层次的立法博弈的难度与优势、国际法律制度的维持等在内的国际法相关问题提供了线索。当然,我们也必须清楚这种立足于理性主义认识论的博弈理论与方法在对国际法各种现象的解释上有着不可避免的局限性。
Since its appearance in the vision of international relations theorists,the game theory has quickly become an effective approach to the analysis of international conflicts and cooperation.Many scholars of international relations have widely used the game theory to support their own research on the construction and maintenance of international regimes,which provides us with the clues to analyze several international legal issues,i.e.,the negotiation and construction of international legislation,the difficulties and advantages of legislation games at various levels,the maintenance of international legal regimes,etc..Certainly,we have to be aware that this game theory approach based on the rationalistic epistemology has inevitable limitations in analyzing international law.
出处
《武大国际法评论》
CSSCI
2010年第1期32-64,共33页
Wuhan University International Law Review
基金
2008年度教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助"(NCET)成果
作者主持的国家社科基金项目"国际关系理论与当代国际法的实践"阶段性成果之一(项目编号:07CFX044)
关键词
国际关系理论
博弈论
国际法
international relations theory
game theory
international law
