摘要
本文以我国2009~2014年A股上市公司为样本,基于行为金融和委托代理理论,聚焦公司经营决策的核心主体——公司CEO,对公司治理、风险偏好与现金股利政策之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:CEO风险偏好与现金股利分配倾向负相关,即风险偏好程度高的CEO倾向于不支付现金股利;高管持股会显著抑制CEO风险偏好与现金股利分配倾向的负相关关系;股权集中度越高,也越能抑制CEO风险偏好与现金股利分配倾向的负相关关系。进一步区分产权性质后发现,相对于国有控股上市公司而言,在非国有控股上市公司中,股权集中度越高对抑制CEO风险偏好与现金股利支付倾向的负相关关系作用越显著,但高管持股会加剧CEO风险偏好与现金股利支付倾向的负相关关系。本研究一方面从理性与非理性视角丰富了现金股利政策的研究成果;另一方面,研究表明公司治理能够在一定程度上制约管理者的非理性行为,从而使其做出有利于中小股东利益的股利决策,具有一定的现实意义。
With data of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2014, this paper explores the influence of CEO risk preferences and corporate governance of a company on its cash dividend policy. The theoretical bases of this study are behavioral finance theory and principalagent theory. It turns out that there is a negative correlation between CEO risk preferences and cash dividend policy. Executive ownership will weaken the negative correlation between CEO risk preferences and cash dividend policy. And the higher the ownership concentration, the weaker the negative correlation between CEO risk preferences and cash dividend policy will be. Moreover, when distinguishing the state ownership, the higher the ownership concentration, the weaker the negative correlation between CEO risk preferences and cash dividend policy will be in non-stateowned companies. But executive ownership has no impact on the negative correlation between CEO risk preferences and cash dividend policy in both state-owned companies and non-stateowned companies. This paper has outstanding value of practice, as it not only enriches the studies of cash dividend policy in the perspective of rationality and non rationality, but also turns out that corporate governance can restrict the non rationality of mangers to some extent, for the dividend decisions in favor of minority shareholders.
出处
《财务研究》
2016年第5期46-56,共11页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71302124)
北京邮电大学青年科创重大项目(2014ZD02)
关键词
CEO风险偏好
公司治理
现金股利政策
行为金融
CEO risk preferences
corporate governance
cash dividend policy
behavioral finance
