摘要
本文旨在考察大股东和高管在现金红利中的不同动机。以1999-2004年度的全部A股上市公司为样本,检验公司高级管理层对现金红利的影响,考察第一大股东发放现金股利的动机,并分析第一大股东对管理层的监督和控制。我们发现,当董事长兼任总经理(二职合一)时,公司发放的现金红利较低;当董事会中管理层比例较高时,公司发放的现金红利也较低;但当第一大股东控股比例较高时,公司的现金红利则较高。进一步研究发现,第一大股东的控股能够削弱二职合一对红利的负面影响,也能够削弱董事会中管理层比例对现金红利的负面影响。本文的经验结果支持了代理理论和大股东降低代理成本假说,即公司管理层普遍不愿进行现金派送,但是大股东能够监督管理层的红利政策;而且大股东的控股比例越高,这种监督作用越明显,越能够缓解代理问题对红利政策的影响。本文的研究结果具有较强的政策意义,即股权分置改革的后期,不一定要急于过度分散股权结构,当大股东和高管分属不同主体时,适度的股权集中有利于对管理层的监督。
This study concerns about the different incentives of controlling shareholder and management in cash dividend policies. Different from previous studies, we examine this issue based on board structure and ownership concentration data and thus obtain quite different results. Using all the A-share companies from year 1999 to 2004 as a sample, this paper examines management＇s influence on cash dividend, analyzes the largest shareholder＇s incentive in cash dividend, and explore the largest shareholder＇s monitoring toward management. It shows that, firms with a combined title of board chair and CEO （CMB） tend to have lower cash dividends, firms that have higher managerial membership on the board tend to pay lower cash dividends, and firms that have higher ownership concentration tend to pay higher cash dividends. This study further shows that the largest shareholder＇s controlling rights tend to weaken the association between CMB and lower cash dividends; it also shows that higher controlling rights of the largest shareholder tends to weaken the association between managerial membership on the board and lower cash dividends. Taken together, this paper supports the agency theory and monitoring role of the largest shareholder： managements are reluctant to pay cash dividends, but the largest shareholder can monitor the managements＇ dividend policy; Still, shareholding of the largest shareholder may conduce to the effectiveness of the monitoring and assuage agency cost. This study provides insightful political implications： by making the previous non-tradable stateowned shares to be tradable, the split share structure reform tends to align the interest of controlling shareholders and minority share- holders. In the subsequent reforms, however, it is not rational to diversify the shareholding excessively. Once the largest shareholder and management are of different entities, it is more efficient to let the largest shareholder to dominate the board and monitor the behavior of senior managements.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2008年第2期15-21,共7页
Nankai Business Review
关键词
二职合一
第一大股东
现金股利
代理理论
Combined Title of Board Chair and CEO
the Largest Shareholder
Cash Dividend
Agency Theory
