摘要
本文以债务的"次优"治理特征为制度背景,研究银行债务对大股东资金占用行为的治理作用。研究结果表明,虽然中国目前存在着预算软约束及偿债机制不完善等制度缺陷,但债务的"次级"治理特征及商业银行的市场化改革仍能保证银行债务能够抑制大股东资金占用行为。由于利率管制政策的存在,银行通过贷款利率政策途径发挥治理作用并未实现,其治理作用主要体现在贷款续新上。当银行发现大股东通过资金占用的方式侵占上市公司利益时,会通过减少、停止发放贷款,甚至提前收回贷款的方式来减少损失,为了获得贷款银行的支持,贷款企业的大股东也会选择减少对资金的占用。
With the characteristics of the "subprime" governance of debts as the system background,this paper researches the role of bank debts in the governance of large shareholder's behavior of occupying fund.The results of the paper show that,though there are system defects such as soft budget-constraint,imperfect debt-paying mechanism etc.currently in China,the "subprime" governance of debts and the market-oriented reforms of commercial banks can ensure bank debts to inhibit large shareholder's behavior of occupying fund.Because of the control policy of interest rate,the role of banks in the governance through the interest rate of loan has not been realized and the role is mainly reflected in additional new loan.When banks find that the large shareholder encroach upon the benefits of listed companies in the way of occupying fund,they will reduce loss by reducing,stopping and even withdrawing the loan.In order to obtain the support of banks to lend,the large shareholder of the companies to borrow will choose to reduce occupying fund.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期26-31,共6页
Finance Forum
基金
教育部人文社科基金"制度环境
债务治理与大股东隧道行为"(10YJC630002)的阶段性成果
关键词
银行债务
大股东
资金占用
贷款续新
贷款利率
bank debt
large shareholder
occupying fund
additional new loan
interest rate of loan
