摘要
国有控股银行的高管面临双重激励,他们不仅可以获得可观的薪酬,还有机会在政治上获得晋升。文章构建了衡量银行高管政治晋升激励的方法,并利用82家国有控股商业银行高管的个人数据,分析了高管双重激励与银行风险的关系以及两类激励之间的替代关系。实证结果表明,不管高管是董事长还是行长,薪酬的增加都会激励其更好地管理银行,降低银行的破产风险,但政治晋升激励对银行风险的负面影响仅对董事长成立。此外,薪酬激励与政治晋升激励之间存在替代关系,而且当前银行高管薪酬的平均水平非常接近实证分析得到的门槛值。因此,维持当前银行高管的薪酬水平而改进其薪酬结构是未来更为可行的方向,这为近期央企高管薪酬改革方案提供了理论依据。
Top executives in state-controlled banks face dual incentives:considerable remuneration and political promotion opportunity.This paper constructs the measurement of political promotion incentive of top executives from banks and analyzes the relationship between dual incentives of top executives and bank risks & the substitution relationship between these two incentives based on the individual data of top executives from 82 statecontrolled commercial banks.It arrives at the following empirical results:the increase in remuneration of both of the chairman of the board and the governor of a bank makes them better manage the bank and reduces the risks of bank bankruptcy,but the negative effect of political promotion incentive on bank risks only exists as for the chairman of the board.In addition,there is a substitution relationship between remuneration and political promotion incentives and the average level of current bank top executives remuneration is very close to the threshold value by empirical analysis.Therefore,the maintenance of current bank top executives remuneration and the optimization of remuneration structure are more feasible direction in the future,providing theoretical evidence for recent reform plan of top executives remuneration of SOEs.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期94-106,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"中国商业银行高管激励约束机制与风险承担研究"(71172066)
国家社会科学基金重大项目"金融风险度量的新理论与新方法及其在中国金融机构的应用研究"(14ZDB124)
关键词
高管
薪酬
政治晋升激励
银行风险
top executive
remuneration
political promotion incentive
bank risk
