摘要
当前我国PPP项目存在重进入、轻退出的现象,PPP项目非正常退出行为频发。以PPP项目非正常退出的内生及外生缘由作为解释框架,并通过演化博弈模型来模拟在PPP项目的全过程中公私双方从初始合作到非正常退出的行为表现。最后基于上述分析,设计了PPP项目非正常退出的内部化路径,以期为优化PPP项目的退出机制提供参考。
At present, China＇s PPP projects attach more importance on entry and less on exit and the abnormal withdrawal tor the PPP project takes place frequently. Using the endogenous and exogenous causes of the abnonnal withdrawal for the PPP project as the explanatory framework, the evolutionary game model is applied to simulate the behavioral performance of the public and private parties from the initial cooperation to the abnonnal withdrawal in the whole process of the PPP project. Based on the above analysis, the way of internalization for the abnonnal withdrawal of PPP project is designed so as to provide reterence for optimizing the withdrawal mechanism of the PPP project.
作者
任志涛
张赛
王滢菡
谷金雨
REN Zhitao;ZHANG Sai;WANG Yinghan;GU Jinyu(School of Economics and Management,Tianjin Chengjian University,Tianjin,300384,China;Hubei Transportation Jingzhou Investment ＆ Development Co.,Ltd,Jingzhou,434000,China;School of Building,Civil and Environmental Engineering,Concordia University,Montreal,H3G1M8,Canada)
出处
《经济与管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期36-46,共11页
Review of Economy and Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"环境治理公私合作共生网络形成机理及管控机制研究"(17YJA630082)
天津市哲学社会科学规划项目"公私合作视角下环境治理多元主体内生责任及实现机制研究--以天津市为例"(TJGL17-010)
关键词
PPP项目
非正常退出
内部化
演化博弈
PPP project
Abnonnal withdrawal
Internalization
Evolutionary game
