摘要
在应急处置环境污染群体性事件过程中,一些地方政府出于维稳原因迅速采取停建搬迁的应急处置决策,反而对其他地区的类似事件造成了负面的示范效应。本文构建了环境污染群体性事件政府应急策略的多周期声誉效应模型,解释了地方政府维稳策略下全国各地爆发PX事件的扩散效应。研究表明,在无政府声誉效应的单周期序贯博弈模型中,当周边群众完全采取妥协策略时,地方政府事前强硬表态绝不搬迁将会降低地方政府的期望成本。考虑政府声誉效应的多周期序贯博弈模型中,地方政府做出停产搬迁决策将对未来时期(或其他地区)产生声誉效应,不仅地方政府的预期成本将会上升,而且声誉效应越大,地方政府预期成本增加值越大。
In dealing with emergency PX events such as environmental pollution group event, local governments, for the sake of dimensional stability, tend to order the trouble-causing project stopped and relocated, but such disposal results in a strong diffusion effect when PX events break out elsewhere. In this paper, a multi cycle reputation effect model of environmental pollution group event of government emergency strategy is constructed, which explains the diffusion effect of PX event under the local government＇s stability-maintaining strategy. The research shows that in the single-cycle sequential game model of the non-government reputation effect, the local government should not move in advance when the surrounding people adopt a compromise strategy, which will reduce the cost of the local government. Considering the government reputation effect of multi-periodic sequential game model, the local government that orders production stopped will have a reputation effect in the future period（or other areas）, not only the local government＇ s expected costs will rise, but the greater the reputation effect, the greater the expected cost of local government.
作者
刘德海
赵宁
邹华伟
Liu Dehai;Zhao Ning;Zou Huawei(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economic;China Merchants Bank Yantai Branc)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第9期239-245,共7页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71271045
71571033
71503033
71602021)
2016年度辽宁省高等学校创新人才支持计划(LR2016019)
东北财经大学"经济博弈论"校级研究生精品课程
关键词
环境污染群体性事件
声誉效应模型
PX事件
应急策略
多周期序贯博弈
environmental pollution group events
reputation effect model
PX event
emergency strategy
multiple periods sequential game
