摘要
从2015年开始,我国出现了很多P2P平台"倒闭"和"跑路"的现象,严重影响了社会的稳定和行业的健康发展,因此,有必要对产生上述问题的原因进行深入的研究。为此,文章建立了P2P平台与投资人之间的博弈模型,分析了平台的逆向选择行为,研究结果表明:只要是信用中介型的P2P平台就会存在逆向选择问题;投资人的收益受投资的利率、融资成功的概率和平台投资成功的概率3个因素的影响,投资利率的提高,会显著增加P2P平台的风险,但不一定会增加投资人的收益;政府的资金监管、借款额度的限制及对P2P平台发布信息的要求在一定程度上可以抑制P2P平台的逆向选择行为,提高投资人的收益。
Since 2015,many P2 Pplatforms＂have collapsed＂and ＂run away＂,which has seriously affected social stability and healthy development of the finance industry in China.Therefore,it is necessary to investigate the causes of these problems.For this reason,the article establishes the game model between P2 Pplatform and investors,and analyzes the adverse selection behavior of platforms.The results show that as long as the P2 P platform is credit intermediary,there will be adverse selections;the benefits of investors are affected by three factors,including investment interest rate,probability of successful financing and probability of successful platform investment.The rise of investment interest rate will increase the risks of P2 Pplatforms significantly,but it is not certain whether the increase of investment interest rate will increase the benefits of investors.Government financial supervision,restrictions on loans and criteria for information from P2 Pplatform can inhibit the adverse selection behavior of P2 Pplatforms and increase the benefits of investors to a certain extent.
作者
任国强
费改英
REN Guoqiang;FEI Gaiying(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,Ohin)
出处
《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期25-30,共6页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目:"完善再分配调节机制研究"(14BJY036)
国家自然科学基金青年项目:"机会集补偿视角下机会平等化收敛机理及实现路径研究"(71403184)
国家自然科学基金项目:"我国企业的收入分配对企业效益影响的定量研究"(71672086)
关键词
P2P平台
博弈模型
逆向选择
政府监管
P2P platform
game model
adverse selection
government regulation
