摘要
由于我国小微贷款市场有效供给不足,P2P网络借贷成为小微企业的新型融资渠道并发展迅速,平台模式呈现线上线下融合的多样化发展趋势。但近两年来,问题平台占比加大、高息投机现象严重,表明P2P网贷市场存在较大的逆向选择风险。本文构建包含P2P网贷平台、担保机构、借款企业和出资人四方的委托代理模型,分析不同P2P网贷平台模式的逆向选择问题及影响。结果表明,无论采取何种平台模式,都会产生逆向选择问题,贷款利率、信息收集费用率、担保费率、平台准备金率越高,逆向选择问题越严重。P2P网贷平台与线下担保机构结合的模式能够较好缓解逆向选择带来的影响,平台自行提取准备金模式的逆向选择问题最为严重。
The growing P2P Lending Platform has been a new financing to small business because the huge gap of small business loan. There are several platforms of P2P lending combing online and offline. In the past two years, the proportion of bad platforms is bigger than before and high speculation on the market indicates that adverse selection is serious. In this paper, we build a principal-agent model including P2P lending platform, guaranty institution, borrower and lender to analyze the adverse selection effect to different platforms. This paper proves that there is adverse selection in whatever platforms and the higher of interest rate, information cost, guaranty cost and reserve cost, the more serious of adverse selection. P2P lending platform, combined with offline guaranty institution, can militate adverse selection, and drawing reserve by platform will have the most serious adverse selection.
出处
《华东理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2015年第4期47-54,共8页
Journal of East China University of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition
基金
国家社科基金项目"地方政府融资平台债务顺周期性及监管机制研究"(郑庆寰主持
编号为12CJY106)的阶段性成果
教育部人文社科青年基金"金融脆弱性的动力学机制及逆周期监管研究"(郑庆寰主持
编号为11YJC790303)
华东理工大学培育基金项目"地方政府债务顺周期性及稳定机制研究"(郑庆寰主持
编号为WN1422010)
"机构股东积极治理参与主体
积极治理行为与市场资源的配置效率"(唐松莲主持
编号为WN1422002)的阶段性成果
关键词
P2P
网贷平台
逆向选择
信用担保
P2P lending platform： adverse selection： credit guaranty
