摘要
反恐防御工作的常态化,使世界各国反恐理论研究与实战能力不断加强,然而随着恐怖组织在世界范围内的蔓延,必然引发创新驱动反恐防御工作进一步发展的问题。本文针对两个易受袭击的目标,运用演化博弈理论,分析了无约束条件和有约束条件下独立防御与合作防御四种情况的演化稳定策略,探究了反恐防御中出现的问题与影响因素。结果表明:当无第三方约束时,独立防御会出现搭便车的问题;合作防御会同时出现囚徒困境和搭便车的问题,无法有效解决独立防御中出现的问题。当有第三方约束时,通过提高对不加强防御行为的惩罚力度,同时提高对达成合作的奖励,可以有效解决独立防御和无第三方约束合作防御中出现的问题。
With the normalization of counterterrorism, counterterrorism theory and practice in all countries around the world are continuously strengthened, but with the spread of terrorist organizations in the world, it poses challenge to the further development of counterterrorism work. This paper aims at two vulnerable targets, using evolutionary game theory, and analyzing the evolution stabilization strategy of independent defense and cooperative defense with and without constraint conditions. Meanwhile, this paper explores the influence factors of counterterrorism defense. The results show that when there is no third-party intervention, the independent defense has a free-rider problem and cooperative defense has both prisoner’s dilemma and free-rider problem. Thus the problem in independent defense cannot be effectively solved. When there is a third-party intervention, both sides are encouraged to strengthen their defense by increasing penalties. At the same time, raising rewards for reaching a cooperation can effectively solve the problems of independent defense and no-third party intervention cooperation defense.
作者
胡晨望
刘忠轶
高岩
王馨怡
HU Chen-wang;LIU Zhong-yi;GAO Yan;WANG Xin-yi(School of Management,People＇s Public Security University of China,Beijing 100038,China;School of Public Security,People＇s Public Security University of China,Beijing 100038,China)
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期67-73,共7页
Forecasting
基金
国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(15ZDA034)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(14BZZ028)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(17YJCZH098)
北京市社会科学基金资助项目(16JDGLA036)
中国人民公安大学基本科研业务费资助项目(2018JKF202
2018JKF336)
关键词
反恐
演化博弈
独立防御
合作防御
counterterrorism
evolutionary game
independent defense
cooperative defense
