摘要
构建政府与企业间的博弈论模型,得出与政府政策偏离纳什均衡的结论,然后通过对模型的改进和对现实的考虑进一步完善模型,探索我国政府推出的装配式建筑优惠补贴政策基于博弈论的稳定性和效益最大化问题,并对政策的制定提出建议。
This paper builds the game model between government and enterprises,and draws the conclusion that Nash＇s equilibrium is deviated from the government＇s policy. Then,based on improving the model and taking the reality into consideration,explores the stability and profi t maximization of the preferential subsidy policy that China＇s government has already taken based on game theory,and puts forward suggestions on policy-making.
作者
张立新
马举
何宝辉
ZHANG Lixin;MA Ju;HE Baohui(Qingdao Technological University, Qingdao 266520, Chin)
出处
《工程经济》
2018年第6期57-59,共3页
ENGINEERING ECONOMY
关键词
装配式建筑
博弈论
优惠补贴
稳定性
assembly building
game theory
preferential subsidy
stability
