摘要
冷战期间美国频繁的单边武力干涉在冷战结束之后多以联合国安理会集体行动的形式出现。但是,作为这种使用武力方式的创立者,美国在历次安理会授权使用武力的实践中参与程度不一,或者不推动授权和不参与行动,或者极力主导授权,有时甚至越过安理会采取单边行动。在美国接受安理会授权执行行动中,也因其极大的自主权导致集体行动偏离轨道。这让安理会授权使用武力这种方式受到国际社会的质疑。本文运用委托—代理理论,将美国通过安理会授权使用武力置于美国—联合国(安理会)—美国这两个阶段的授权链中进行分析。在第一阶段,作为委托者的美国其委托决策是基于本国的利益偏好,同时也要受到国内和国际两层委托者结构的限制;在第二阶段,作为代理者的美国在执行安理会授权过程中所获得的自主权过大,导致在行动中产生代理懈怠并造成安理会的代理损失,而安理会并没有有效的控制手段对此进行限制。本文最后从国际社会共同利益和国际政治现实出发,提出了对美国代理行为可行的限制设想。
The frequent unilateral armed intervention by the U.S.during the Cold War has emerged mostly in the form of the collective action of the UN Security Council afterwards.However,as the founder of this form of use of force,the levels of the participation of the United States in the practice of the Security Council authorizing the use of force are not all the same;either the U.S.failed to promote the authorization and participate in the actions,or it dominated the delegation of authority and sometimes even bypassed the Security Council to take action unilaterally.In the operations authorized by the Security Council accepted by the United States to implement,the collective actions have also been deviated from their track due to the great autonomy of the United States.This has led the form of the use of force authorized by the Security Council to be challenged by the international community.This article uses the principal-agent theory to analyze the use of force by the United States through the authorization of the Security Council by putting it in the two phases of the authorization chain:the United States-the United Nations(UNSC)-the United States.In the first phase,as the principal,the decision of the United States to promote the authorization would base on its own national interests and be restricted by the structures of both the domestic and international principals.In the second phase,as the agent,the United States would gain excessive autonomy in the process of carrying out the authorization of the Security Council,resulting in the slack on the part of agent and the loss of the Security Council as the principal;and the Security Council does not have effective measures of control against this situation.Finally,based on the common interests of the international community and the reality of international politics,this article puts forward some feasible suggestions for restricting the action of the United States as the agent.
出处
《国际关系研究》
2018年第1期87-108,156-157,共22页
Journal of International Relations
基金
国家社科基金项目"联合国安理会授权使用武力机制的改革问题研究"(项目编号:14BGJ029)的阶段性成果
关键词
安理会授权使用武力
联合国集体安全
美国对外使用武力
委托—代理理论
the UN Security Council authorizing the use of force
collective action of the UN Security Council
armed intervention by the U. S.
principal-agent theory
