摘要
运用非对称进化博弈模型理论,根据政府与私人投资者两个参与方之间的利益博弈关系,通过博弈模型对PPP公租房投融资参与方的期望收益进行计算,建立政府与私人投资群体的进化博弈趋势图,从而确定博弈结构进化特性改变的阈值。通过两方博弈的分析结果,提出了政府应积极加大公租房建设的力度,并为公租房建设投资者提供税收上的优惠、货币直接补贴措施和贷款贴息等政策,以期使公租房项目建设中政府和私人投资方实现双赢。
This paper applies asymmetric evolutionary game theory according to the game of interest between game two parties involved in the government investment and private trends investors,establishes through the evolutionary PPP of government and private groups the game model public rental the investment evolutionary and the expected financing the participants earnings for calculation so as of to determine characteristics of game change threshold.Through the analysis increase and the game between the two parties,it is proposed provide that the government should actively the public rental subsidy incentives,direct make housing construction,and tax monetary subsidies loan interest projects for public rental and investors so as to the construction of public rental housing the government private investors to achieve a win-win situation.
作者
战松
杨万鹏
ZHAN Song;YANG Wanpeng(School of Management, Shenyang Jianzhu University, Shenyang 110168, China)
出处
《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》
2018年第2期186-190,共5页
Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science
基金
辽宁省经济社会发展立项课题(2016lslktyb-145)
沈阳市社会科学界联合会立项课题(SYSK2017-08-04)
关键词
PPP模式
公租房
投融资
博弈分析
the PPP model
public rental housing
investment and financing
game analysis
