摘要
传统工程审计对工程实体质量及参建方工程质量行为的审计监督较少,尤其缺乏对监理方行为的监督审计。针对工程监理与审计机构之间的多阶段博弈过程,从相关者利益最大化角度出发,构建了工程监理质量行为选择的计算实验模型,设计了不同审计成本投入、审计频率及处罚强度下的多种实验情景,通过计算实验得到了工程监理质量行为及收益等的演化结果,分析发现:审计机构需通过加大审计成本投入,使用高审计频率及合理控制处罚强度来规制监理单位质量反向行为。
Traditional engineering audit focuses on the legitimacy of the project cost control and project management,while the supervision of engineering quality behavior of participants is less,especially lacking the supervision of the supervisors.Therefore,a multi-stage game theory model from the perspective of stakeholders is built to evaluate the quality of engineering supervision behavior.The results show that the audit department should increase the audit cost,improve the frequency of audit,and adjust the punishment strength to constraint the reverse behavior of supervision department.
作者
夏浩
季永蔚
XIA Hao;JI Yong-wei(Hua Shen Tie Yuan Engineering Management Research Institute, Nanjing 210000, China;Hua Sheng Xing Wei Consultation and Evaluation Audit Institutions, Nanjing 210000, China)
出处
《工程管理学报》
2018年第1期29-34,共6页
Journal of Engineering Management
关键词
质量行为
工程监理
工程审计
计算实验
quality behavior
engineering consultants
engineering audit
computational experiment
