摘要
猪肉营养价值高而且竞争优势明显。笔者针对我国近几年猪肉质量安全事件频发的问题,建立了猪肉供应商与屠宰加工商对猪肉质量投入的演化博弈模型,并进行求解分析。在此基础上,构建了在政府补贴机制下的演化博弈策略,并利用赋值模拟了演化路径,分析了其影响因素。结果表明：演化博弈受到模型的质量投入的额外收益、投入成本、初始状态、一方不实施质量投入给另一方带来的损失、政府的补贴机制等因素的影响。
Pork has high nutritional value and obvious competitive advantage. In view of the pork quality problem in recent years in our country,the evolutionary game model on pork quality input by the pork supplier and slaughter processors is established and solved in this paper. Basically,the evolutionary game strategy under the government subsidy mechanism is constructed,and the evolution path and its influencing factors are simulated using assignment method.The analysis shows that the evolutionary game are affected by the additional input after the quality input of the model,the input cost,the initial state,the loss by the nonperformance of one party to another on quality input,and the subsidy mechanism of the government et al.
作者
徐耀群
于骐嘉
XU Yaoqun, YU Qijia(College of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150028, Chin)
出处
《黑龙江畜牧兽医》
CAS
北大核心
2018年第6期1-5,共5页
Heilongjiang Animal Science And veterinary Medicine
基金
国家软科学研究计划项目“产业结构优化视角下的物流网络结构配置研究”(2013GXS4D115)
关键词
演化博弈
猪肉供应链
质量投入
补贴机制
猪肉供应商
屠宰加工商
evolutionary game
pork supply chain
quality input
subsidy mechanism
pork supplier
the slaughter of processors
