摘要
本文假定一国仅有一个非一体化企业,而另一国既有一个一体化企业又有一个中间品生产企业。非一体化企业需要向中间品生产企业购买中间产品方能生产最终产品,中间品的价格由双方谈判确定。两国企业生产的最终产品全部出口到第三国市场,并在第三国市场上进行产量竞争。在此背景下,本文利用第三国市场模型和博弈论,考察了企业谈判势力对一国出口政策的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在企业同时竞争的情形,还是在企业先后进入市场竞争的情形,企业谈判势力均通过影响中间产品的价格进而影响到水平转移利润和垂直转移利润的相对大小,从而影响到一国贸易政策的选择。此外,两国间贸易政策的非合作博弈有可能达成双赢的结局。
We establish a model that one country only has an unintegrated firm and another country have an integrated firm and an intermediate goods manufacturer. The unintegrated firm buys an intermediate good to make a unit final product from the intermediate goods manufacturer. The price of the intermediate good is decided by the intermediate goods manufacturer＇s bargaining power. All final products export to a third country and the market competition model is quantity competition. Under these conditions, this paper explores the impact of the intermediate goods manufacturer＇s bargaining power on a country＇s export policy using the third market model and game theory. The results show that no matter firms simultaneously or suc- cessively enter the third market, the bargaining power will influence one country＇s trade policy through the relative size of horizontal profit-shifting and vertical profit-shifting due to the price change of the intermedi- ate good. Moreover, two countries＇ trade policies non-cooperative game may result in two-win.
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期80-100,共21页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71303134)
泰山学者工程专项经费资助
山东财经大学优势学科人才团队培育计划的资助
关键词
谈判势力
中间品贸易
出口政策
市场时序
bargaining power, intermediate goods trade, export policy, market timing
