摘要
休谟主义与反休谟主义的争论构成了当代认识论与科学哲学中因果理论研究的主要线索。休谟主义主张从相关性角度界定因果作用，主张所有因果知识都是推论性的，并在反休谟主义的批评下更新自身。反休谟主义则试图从“生成”概念界定因果关系，主张可以存在非推论的单称因果判断。两者的分歧最终可以归结为是寻求因果知识的“证成”还是“理解”的理论动机差异。而从证成转向理解，意味着认识论上的“德性转向”，即认知规范性从“遵从规则”转向以理智德性为核心的概念。这为重新评价有关休谟主义的争论提供了新的思路。
The debates between Humeanists and Anti-Humeanists have constructed a substantial issue in studies upon causation in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Humean theorists argue for correlations in defining causation, and claim inferentiality as necessary for all knowledge of causation, which would be also held by Neo-Humean theories. However, Anti-Humean theorists put forward the notion of production in order to characterize causation, which suggests some possibilities of non-inferential judgments on singular causation. This paper argues that the distinction between justifying knowledge of causation and understanding causation could be characterized as the substantial difference between Humean and Anti-Humean theoretical motivation. The perspective from virtue epistemology, which claims a turn on epistemic normativity from the conception of rule-following to the notion of intellectual virtue, is supposed to give out a Humean theory of causation. new approach in reevaluating the debates concerning
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期48-57,93,共11页
Academic Monthly
基金
国家社科基金项目(12CZX016)
中国科学院科技史青年人才研教项目“模型表征的科学认识论与技术认识论比较研究”的阶段性成果
关键词
因果关系
休谟主义
理解
德性认识论
causation, Humean theory, understanding, virtue epistemology
