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市场细分下考虑顾客信息关注与搜索的质量披露策略 被引量:2

Quality Disclosure Strategy Considering Customer Information Attentiveness and Search Under Market Segmentation
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摘要 本文将市场细分为具有品牌偏好的忠实顾客和具有质量偏好的有限理性顾客,研究顾客信息关注、监督与搜索对质量披露策略的影响。通过分析顾客不同行为因素对卖家的市场占有率和均衡收益的影响,建立顾客信息未知、信息不完全和信息已知3种市场需求下的卖家收益模型,运用博弈方法,获得卖家的最优质量披露阈值和均衡利润。并对结果进行仿真验证,分析顾客质量偏好、忠实顾客比例、顾客关注度、顾客搜索成本和卖家披露成本对卖家的质量披露阈值和均衡利润的影响。结果表明:随着顾客质量偏好增加,卖家的收益减少;随着顾客搜索成本增加,卖家的质量披露阈值升高,卖家的收益增加;当顾客关注度处于中间值时,卖家的质量披露阈值和收益都取得最大值。这为卖家制定质量披露决策提供依据。 To subdivide customers into loyal customers with brand preference and bounded rational customers with quality preference,quality disclosure strategies considering customers information attentiveness,supervision and search behavior are studied. By analyzing how different behavior factors of two types customers have effect on sellers' market share and equilibrium returns,the sellers' profit model in three cases which include informed customers,partially informed customers and uninformed customers is established,and using the game theory the optimal quality disclosure threshold and equilibrium profit of seller are calculated. Finally,by numerical simulation sellers' quality disclosure threshold and equilibrium profit function,customer quality,the influence which quality disclosure threshold and equilibrium profits are affected by proportion of loyal customers,customers' attentiveness,and customers' search cost and sellers disclosure cost are analyzed. The results show that seller benefits reduce when customers' quality preference increases. The improving of customers' search costs improve the quality disclosure threshold and income of sellers,and when customers' attentiveness is in the middle value,quality disclosure,threshold and benefits of the sellers are the most optimal. These conclusions provide the basis for quality disclosure decisions of sellers.
出处 《工业技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第3期79-86,共8页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目"考虑行为特征的供应链质量控制策略研究"(项目编号:71371043) "考虑复杂情形的服务供应链质量控制容错策略研究"(项目编号:71771044)
关键词 质量偏好 信息关注 信息搜索 市场细分 质量披露 均衡利润 quality preferences information attentive information search market segmentation quality disclosure equilibrium return
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