摘要
文章从政府转移支付政策出发,通过构建微政务信息公开中的上下级政府信号博弈模型,分析了在3种贝叶斯均衡下的双方策略行为选择及影响因素。研究表明,上级政府微政务信息公开最优策略的选择与下级政府的作假概率密切相关,也与下级政府微政务信息公开所处阶段密切相关。
Based on the government transfer payment policy, the strategic choices and the influencing factors of the upper and the lower governments in three Bayesian equilibriums are analyzed by constructing the signaling game model between the two parties. Research shows that the optimal strategic choice of the upper government is closely related to the false probability of the lower level government, as well as the stages of information disclosure of the lower level government.
出处
《情报理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期107-111,共5页
Information Studies:Theory & Application
基金
2015年国家社会科学基金项目"公平关切视角下微政务信息公开的动力机制与创新模式研究"的成果之一
项目编号:15BTQ052
关键词
微政务
信号博弈
转移支付
信息公开
micro government affairs
signaling game
transfer payment
information disclosure
