摘要
文章以博弈论为研究方法,基于废旧产品回收质量不确定,建立政府有差别补贴下的闭环供应链定价决策模型,对比分析了政府补贴第三方回收商和制造商两种补贴方式,探讨了政府差别补贴和回收质量不确定对闭环供应链定价决策的影响。研究表明:提高回收质量有助于提高废旧产品的回收价格、回收数量、第三方回收商和制造商的利润;政府差别补贴可以有效激励第三方回收商提高废旧产品的回收质量、回收价格、回收数量和提高第三方回收商与制造商的利润;产品销售价格和零售商利润只与新产品制造成本相关,不受政府补贴和回收质量不确定的影响;在政府补贴制造商的情况下,当新产品制造成本提高时,制造商会选择回收更多高质量的废旧产品进行再制造;再制造成本和差别补贴系数大小对两种补贴方式的补贴效果影响较大。最后通过数值算例和仿真分析验证了模型的正确性。
The paper uses the game theory as a research method, based on the uncertain quality of used products, to establish closed-loopsupply chain pricing decision models under differential government subsidies, comparatively analyzes the two types of government subsi-dizing third-party recycler and manufacturer, and discusses how the government subsidies and uncertain quality of used products affectclosed-loop supply chain pricing decisions. The results show that:The increase of recycling quality can improve recycling price, the quan-tity of used products, the profits of third-party recycler and manufacturer; Differential government subsidies can effectively motivate thethird-party recycler to improve the recycling quality, the recycling price, the recycling quantity of used products and improve the profits ofthird-party recycler and manufacturer; Sales price of products and retailers' profits are only related to the manufacturing costs of newproducts, not affected by the government subsidies and uncertain recycling quality; In the case of government subsidizing manufacturer,when manufacturing costs of new product increase, manufacturers usually recycle more high quality used products for remanufacturing; Re-manufacturing costs and the coefficient of differential government subsidies have great effects on the two types of government subsidies. Fi-nally, the validity of the model is proved by numerical calculations and simulation analysis.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期146-152,共7页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71673118
71273118)
关键词
闭环供应链
差别补贴
回收质量不确定
质量成本系数
定价决策
closed-loop supply chain
differential government subsidies
uncertain quality of used products
the coefficient of quality costs
pricing decision
