摘要
将企业社会责任和政府补贴引入到供应链的决策研究中,构建了一个由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,假设制造商和零售商共同履行企业社会责任,研究三种不同权力结构下供应链的最优决策,探讨政府补贴如何激励企业承担更多CSR。研究发现,三种渠道权力结构下政府补贴都能够激励制造商和零售商履行更多的CSR行为,但零售商作为领导者时,制造商不一定总是愿意接受补贴,渠道权力相当时,制造商和零售商都不一定愿意接受政府补贴;在制造商主导供应链和零售商主导供应链下,政府补贴的增加对供应链有激励作用,但供应链成员权力相当时,随着政府补贴的增加,制造商的利润先增大后减小。
Corporate social responsibility and government subsidies are introduced into the study of decisionmaking in the supply chain.The supply chain is composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.It is assumed that both the manufacturer and the retailer fulfill corporate social responsibility.The optimal decisions are researched in three kinds of supply chains under different power structures.It is discussed that how do government subsidies stimulate enterprises to undertake more CSR.The study found that under three channel power structures,government subsidies can motivate the manufacturer and the retailer to perform more CSR.However,when the retailer is the leader,the manufacturer is not always willing to accept subsidies;when channel powers are equal,the manufacturer and the retailer are not always willing to accept government subsidies.In the cases of manufacturerled supply chain and retailer-led supply chain,the increase of government subsidies has an incentive effect on the supply chain.However,when the members of the supply chain have equal rights,with the increase of government subsidies,the profit of the manufacturer will first increase and then decrease.
作者
魏恒
王继光
WEI Heng;WANG Ji-Guang(School of Economics and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期86-93,共8页
On Economic Problems
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“考虑中断风险情境的供应链设施选址优化与协调研究”(16YJC630116)。
关键词
企业社会责任
政府补贴
社会责任履行水平
渠道权力
corporate social responsibility
government subsidies
social responsibility performance
channel power
