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绩效评估下员工行为的数学模型 被引量:2

Employee Behavior Under the Performance Evaluation
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摘要 在绩效评估的管理体制下,组织希望员工努力工作,使得组织的绩效最大;员工则考虑在评估机制下,如何分配精力,使得自己的效益最大,这两者往往并不一致,从而构成了在绩效评估下的主从博弈.建立了绩效评估下的主从博弈模型,研究了最优解的结构;利用双层规划求解,得到Stackelberg均衡.以高校教师的绩效评估为例,验证了模型的合理性与有效性,为完善绩效评估提出了建议. Abstract: Under the management system of performance evaluation, the organization wants employees to work hard and make the performance of the organization. And the employees consider how to distribute their energy under the assessment mechanism to make their own benefit. The two often don't agree with each other. The problem constitutes a Stackelberg Game under the performance evaluation. This paper establishes the Stackelberg Game model, researches the structure of the optimal solution, solves the problem using Bilevel Programming method. An example of the performance evaluation of university teacher is used to verify the rationality and validity of the model. In the result, this paper proposes some suggestion to improve the performance evaluation.
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 北大核心 2017年第20期37-44,共8页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词 主从博弈 双层规划 绩效评估 最优解结构 STACKELBERG均衡 master-slave game bi-level programming performance evaluation optimal solution structure Stackelberg equilibrium
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