摘要
研究由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链共享信息均衡问题。两个零售商具有不同的私有成本信息。当零售商不公开此成本信息时,其他的零售商和供应商只能推断出该信息的模糊分布。不同市场需求参数下,使零售商和供应商均达到最大利润的局势也有所不同。为了使供应链上的供应商和零售商达到双赢,分析了各同均衡策略存在的前提条件。
The coordination equilibrium in supply chain is studied. This supply chain contains a supplier and two heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure. If a retailer does not want to share his information, then the other retailer and the supplier can only know his fuzzy informa- tion. The coordination results are not the same when the parameters of demand function are different. We propose the necessary condition under which some kind of coordination equilibrium exists. In the coordination e- quilibrium, the whole supply chain gets the win-win situation.
作者
于晓辉
周鸿
张旭凤
刘艳
YU Xiao-hui;ZHOU Hong;ZHANG Xu-feng;LIU Yan(Logistics School, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China;School of Information, Beijing Wuzi U- niversity, Beijing 101149, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第10期74-80,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目资助(17YJC630203)
国家自然科学基金资助(71771025
71371030
J1624001
71401003)
北京教委科技提升计划(TSJH20161003701)
北京物资学院学科建设(质量管理工程)
关键词
模糊集
加值
供应链
博弈论
fuzzy set
valued-added
supply chain
game theory
