摘要
随着我国经济进入新常态,风险承担水平已成为家族企业持续生存的核心问题。本文基于社会情感财富的分析视角,运用实证方法研究我国上市家族企业控制权、薪酬激励与企业风险承担之间的关系。研究表明家族企业现金流权提高会降低企业风险承担水平,两权分离度、金字塔层级增加会提高企业风险承担水平;货币薪酬激励和高管持股激励会调节家族控制权对企业风险承担水平的影响。因此,保持适度的两权分离可以防止控制权不合理而带来过高的企业风险承担水平,同时实行长短期结合的薪酬激励有利于将家族企业的风险承担水平控制在合理范围,为家族企业的持续发展提供强力的制度保障。
Based on the perspective of social emotional wealth, this paper summarizes the theoretical assumptions between control rights, executive compensation and corporate risk-taking of the family firm in our country, then uses the empirical method to examine the proposed theoretical assumptions and specifically analyzes the influence relationships. The empirical study shows that the unreasonable structure of control rights and the improper compensation incentive of executives can be found in most of listed family firms which lead to the unsatisfactory level of corporate risk-taking. In addition, appropriate compensation incentive of executives can effectively regulate the relationship between structure of control rights and corporate risk-taking of family firms. The study not only helps to understand the effect and process of the adjustment of family firms control rights and the measures of compensation incentive of executives on corporate risk-taking level, but also provides guidance for the inheritance of family firms and the management on the professional managers. These are referenced for the controlling shareholders, managements of family firms and supervision departments.
出处
《浙江社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期51-59,共9页
Zhejiang Social Sciences
基金
浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地课题--"基于浙商文化视角的民营企业社会责任及信息披露机制优化研究"(编号:16JDGH095)
温州人经济研究中心课题"基于社会情感财富视角的温州家族企业创新研究"(编号:15JDZS03ZD)
关键词
家族企业
社会情感财富
控制权
高管薪酬
风险承担
family firm
social emotional wealth
control rights
executive compensation
rick taking
